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Historically, the United States-Turkey relations followed a checkered pattern notably in 
the aftermath of the World War II when direct political intercourses commenced in earnest. 
Throughout the Cold War, Turkey implicitly acted as the outpost of American-led Western 
World against the then omnipresent threat of Soviet expansion, thereby pursuing a foreign 
policy concurrent with US expectations. Though Turkey was highly regarded as an ally, it was 
left in the lurch on many occasions by American policymakers, which bruised the spirit of the 
alliance and generated an atmosphere of mistrust in bilateral relations. Likewise, the bilateral 
relations in the wake of the Cold War era might be characterized with consecutive thaws and 
tensions as the demise of the Soviet threat paved way for more independent Turkish foreign 
policy. Toward and after the turn of the millenium, the bilateral relations were identified with 
more conceptual terms like “strategic partnership”. However, from the very inception of the 
AK Party tenure hitherto, the trajectory of relations has taken on a new and unprecedented 
dimension as Turkey has become a regional power of greater potency and been in search of a 
more ranking position on the global and regional scale.  
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INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the new millenium, Turkey-US relations be-
nefited the final phase of the “strategic partnership” which had 
been established long ago during the Cold War era. The bilat-
eral relations, surviving the spells of rift in and after the cold 
war, reached at the first decade of the 21st century in a moder-
ate atmosphere. However, a set of watershed events brought a 
seachange in the course of the relations.
Not long after the inauguration of Bush as the President in 
2000, the world as well as American community were taken 
aback by the notorious 9/11 terrorist events, which led to a 
drastic shift in the US foreign policy. With the establishment 
of the preemptive strike doctrine introduced by Bush adminis-
tration, USA waged war on terrorism on a global scale. (Terzi, 
Sonmezoglu & Baklacıoglu, 2012, 323-325) This paved the 
way for US security policy to be centered upon the tinderbox of 
terrorist organizations notably in the Middle East, thereby initi-
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ating the Operation Enduring Freedom to overthrow the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan. The next phase of the war on terrorism targeted the 
country of Iraq, which gave momentum to US-Turkey relations since 
Turkish stance on the prospective US moves became of greater concern 
for American policymakers. (Dagci, 2012, 1-2)
BUSH’S TENURE: RESUMPTION OF THE EXISTING “STRA-
TEGIC PARTNERSHIP”
American demands for military cooperation with Turkey coincided 
with the preliminary months of the AK Party tenure. The resolution of 
utilization of Turkish territory as military bases for US troops in the Ir-
aqi operation was voted in Turkish Parliament and the bill named “De-
ployment of Turkish Armed Forces Abroad and Deployment of Foreign 
Forces in Turkey” was rejected on 2003, March 1st.
Turkish Parliament’s veto on accommodation of US combatant 
troops in Turkey created mutual crisis and was said by many to have led 
to the demise of the former “strategic partnership.” The tension grew 
higher with the iniquitous apprehension of Turkish military personnel 
in Iraq by US troops. Hoods were placed over the heads of Turkish sol-
diers in a way that later was regarded as an insult to Turkish national 
pride. The ostensible reason for such a practice was the search of retali-
ation against the Bill of March 1st. The incident, coupled with the ag-
gressive stance of Bush administration on the Middle Eastern countries, 
created a great backlash in Turkey and anti-American public opinion 
rocketed in Turkish community.
The bilateral relations suffered from an atmosphere of mutual mis-
trust till the year of 2006 when action was taken to redeem the said 
negative atmosphere. Both states became signatory to an agreement ini-
tiated under the heading “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue” by 
Turkish Foreign Ministry and US Secretary of State.  (Dagci, 2012, 4-5) 
This initiative was allocated much hype in the media with US Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice saying: “Sometimes it’s very important to 
step back from the day-to-day issues and to look at the broad relation-
ship, and to remind ourselves and to remind our populations that this 
is a relationship that is broad and deep and based on values and based 
on strategic interests, and that’s really what this document allows us 
to do.” and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul putting it: “The 
shared vision document will enable our countries to conduct close and 
intensive consultations on many levels; it will provide for a structured 
dialogue; it will enable us to address more effective the issues of bilat-
eral, regional and international concern.” (Enginsoy, 2006)
The document was an instrument of the policy of reviving the 
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formerly damaged “strategic partnership”. With the document, both 
countries pledged themselves to work together on all issues of common 
concern, including promoting peace and stability in the broader Middle 
East through democracy, supporting international efforts towards peace-
ful settlement of all regional conflicts, improving the energy security in 
the region and fighting against terrorism and PKK in earnest. 
Notwithstanding this common ground, the following period was a 
time of fragility for Turkish-American relations. In Turkey, AK Party 
emerged victorious in the national elections of 2007, July,  consolid-
ating its position in Turkish political system by garnering nearly half 
of the votes of the electors. Meanwhile, a terrorist attack on Turkish 
Armed Forces by PKK terrorist organization in October had become 
the last straw before Turkish Parliament passed a bill permitting the 
crossborder military operation against PKK bases in Northern Iraq. US 
top brass adopted a stance against the prospective operation stating that 
it would harm Iraq’s stability. This stance created back again a state 
of mistrust, bruising the transient positive atmosphere created by the 
Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue. Subsequently, in PM Erdogan’s 
official visit to White House in November, Bush administration pledged 
to open Iraqi airspace to Turkey and provide intelligence and cooper-
ation against PKK, which served to the moderating of the prevailing 
tension.   
In 2007, the state of Turkish-American relations deteriorated ow-
ing to another issue. Similar to the previous attempts back in 2000 and 
2005, US House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee 
passed Armenian Genocide legislation to recognize the allegations and 
reflect them in US foreign policy. The legislation was delivered to the 
Congress as a proposal. At this point, the Speaker of Turkish Parliament 
sent a letter to the Speaker of the Congress stating that the passage of 
the bill through Congress would harm Turkish-American relations as 
well as it would escalate the ongoing latent crisis between Turkey and 
Armenia.  (Dagci, 2012, 4-5)
In Bush’s tenure, the state of Turkish-American relations was ob-
served to have followed a checkered pattern. Even at times of escalating 
crisis, US top brass could not afford the further deterioration of the bi-
lateral relations. This was mainly due to US expectations from Turkey. 
For the “Greater Middle East Initiative” project by Bush administration 
with a view of restructuring the Middle East in line with US interests by 
systematically promoting and enforcing democracy in non-democratic 
countries of the region; Turkey, with its Muslim, secular and democratic 
identity, was designated as the model country for the initiative. Both 
countries had common interests in the stability of Middle East, fight 
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against terrorism, security of regional energy streams. This rendered 
Turkey an indispensable strategic ally. However, the eventual failure 
of the military operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq raised questions 
about the sustainability of the initiative and Turkey’s role in the project. 
(Dagci, 2012, 6)
OBAMA’S TENURE: TRANSITION TO “MODEL PARTNER-
SHIP” AND INTERMITTENT FAILURES
During George W.Bush’s reign, the international society had be-
come disgusted of the repercussions of his foreign policy moves and 
the world had been in quest of a new phase in US political history. 
The relief came when Barrack Obama was inaugurated as the new US 
president in 2009. With the emphasis he had made on bringing up a 
radical change, the societies of the world states including that of Tur-
key regarded Obama as the embodiment of a more favourable way of 
governing.
Obama’s foreign policy vision was in no compliance with that of 
Bush’s.  Left with the remnants of the conflicts and issues of Bush’s 
term, he abandoned his predecessor’s aggressive policies on Middle 
East and was intent on pursuing policies concurrent with the interna-
tional consensus. 
In Obama’s foreign policy vision, the USA partly preserved the 
status quo in the Middle East and relatively directed its leverage and at-
tention to Asia-Pasific region, thereby leaving a latent power vacuum in 
the region where regional actors, especially Turkey and Iran, could pur-
sue more independent foreign policies. In compliance with this trend, 
Ankara expected the abrogation of the asymmetrical feature of bilateral 
relations with Washington and aspired both parties to behave as equal 
actors and partners with the focus shifting from security-military is-
sues to multifaceted issues. Besides, Obama initially renounced Bush’s 
earlier policy of “you are either with us or against us” toward its allies. 
In this regard, Obama administration tolerated the differences with its 
ally Turkey and sought to consolidate the cooperation and partnership 
with Ankara despite the existence of these differences. These rationales 
put forward a mutual will to bring the bilateral relations to a new di-
mension.  (Kurtbag, 2015, 187-189)
With the inception of AK Party’s second governmental term, which 
coincided with Obama’s presidential inauguration, Turkish foreign poli-
cymakers led by the new Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu under the 
AK Party Government adopted a tendency to conduct policies through 
underlying principles coded with the terms of rhythmic diplomacy, mul-
ti-dimensional foreign policy, zero problems with neighbors, order in-
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stituting actor, international cooperation and proactive foreign policy. 
Determined to eliminate the all-encompassing misconception that Tur-
key had only been performing the roles assigned by global designers 
of regional politcs, the new policymaking cadre determined a political 
vision and set out to execute foreign policy in line with national prior-
ities. Through this new vision, Turkey rejected the preoccupation with 
pursuing the traditional ties with West World and sought to diversify the 
foreign relations by reestablishing and enforcing economic, diplomatic 
and political relations with countries in the region of late-Ottoman ter-
ritories, which was criticized by many and considered to be an axis shift 
in foreign policy. (Davutoglu, 2012, 3-5)
Parallel to the search of autonomy in foreign policy attitudes by 
Turkish governmental top brass, Obama administration felt a need to 
redefine the framework of bilateral relations. As President, Obama paid 
his first transoceanic visit to Turkey with a view to reestablishing the 
damaged relations during Bush period. This visit was very constructive 
in terms of gaining a new dimension in Turkish-American relations. 
In his visit, Obama declared his high opinions of Turkey and the visit 
was welcomed by many. In his speech delivered before the members of 
Turkish Parliament, Obama put it as: “The United States and Turkey 
have not always agreed on every issue, and that’s to be expected - no 
two nations do. But we have stood together through many challenges 
over the last 60 years. And because of the strength of our alliance and 
the endurance of our friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger 
and the world is more secure.” (Han, 2010, 98-101)
Obama’s foreign policy understanding regarded Turkey as a “model 
partner” as opposed to “strategic partner”. Strategic partnership, as a 
concept, had meant a kind of alliance in which both countries acted 
together against a common threat on military and intelligence base. 
Model partnership, on the other hand, did not indicate a reciprocally 
agreed framework but renounced the hierarchical structure of bilateral 
relations and rendered the two parties equal.  (Dagcı, 2012, 8) All in 
all, though utilized in the speeches delivered by the top brass of both 
parties, the term “model partnership” remained vague and the polit-
ical developments transpiring in the following period when Ankara and 
Washington didn’t see eye to eye raised concerns over the sustainability 
of the new dimension of alliance conceptualized with this term.
In May 2010, Turkey and Brazil announced a fuel-swap deal with 
Iran. The Tehran Declaration stipulated that enriched nuclear fuel was 
to be provided to Iran in exchange for dipositing 1,200 kilograms of 
low-enriched uranium to Turkey.  (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2010) The USA and other global political actors were left in consterna-
2 0 1 6 / 2
58
Dr. Metin AKSOY
tion that enriched fuel would enable Iran to further enrich uranium and 
attain the level necessary to construct a nuclear weapon more rapidly.  
(Gurzel, 2012) Nearly a month later, Turkey voted against the UN sanc-
tions on Iran in United Nations Security Council, which, coupled with 
the earlier deal, sufficed to damage the bilateral relations with USA. 
(Ozerkan, 2010) However, at NATO summit of November 2010 in 
Lisbon, Turkey accepted US demands of placing the military radars in 
Turkish territories under the new missile defense project at the expense 
of damaging the relations with Iran, which was considered by many 
to be an act in favour of the atmosphere created by the declaration of 
“model partnership.” (Kurtbag, 2015, 193)
Principally owing to the influential activisms of Jewish lobby in 
American policymaking institutions, the well-being of Turkey-US rela-
tions had always been riding on Turkey’s relations with Israel, as was 
the case back in 2009-2010. Israel committed atrocities on Muslims 
during and following the Gaza War in 2008-2009, for which many of 
the world communities remained silent. Turkey, on the contrary, raised 
objections to the humanitarian drama transpiring in Gaza owing to the 
Israeli-imposed blockade. It came as much of a surprise to the interna-
tional communtiy when Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stood up at 
Davos Summit in 2009 and slammed Israel for its unilateral Palestine 
policy and acts of civil rights violations. Besides, Turkey’s mediation 
efforts to whittle away at the provocative policies of Israel could not 
produce the expected results. (Ozhan, 2010, 10)
In addition, Turkish and American policymakers didn’t see eye to 
eye on the unfolding of the events in Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One 
important difference in this regard was the assessment of Hamas. USA 
recognized Hamas as a radical terrorist organization while Turkish as-
sessment of the group remained relatively more subtle. While such a 
difference existed, the international community heard of the news of 
Israeli army attacking an international humanitarian aid flotilla sailing 
from Turkey en route to Gaza. Israel had breached international law 
by carrying out military operation in international waters and killing 
and injuring the passengers. The incident directed the attention of in-
ternational community to the broader issue of Gaza blockade and great 
backlash came from the international public opinion. However, US top 
brass shared the view that Israel had utilized its right of self-defense 
by conducting military operation on the flotilla and even the earlier 
Gaza blockade had been an act of self-defense.  (Wexler, 2010, 9-11) 
US stance on the issue caused much damage to Turkey-USA relations 
as anti-American sentiment grew in the Muslim community of Turkey.
Meanwhile, in the wake of the outbreak of Arab spring, Turkey 
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adopted a stance consonant with the expectations of Washington by 
utterly supporting Egyptian community against Mubarak regime and 
reluctantly favoring the NATO intervention against Gaddafi regime in 
Libya. In Egypt, after the fall of Mubarak regime, Turkey had advoc-
ated Muslim Brotherhood and in the national elections Moursi had been 
elected as the President. Toward the end of 2013, General Abdul Fattah 
al-Sisi staged and achieved a presidential coup. Subsequently, a dis-
agreement emerged between Ankara and Washington over the legitim-
acy of the coup. While Turkey raised political objections to the found-
ation of Sisi-administration, Washington didn’t even name the event as 
a coup and claimed the coup to be legitimate in establishing democracy 
in the country. This difference disrupted the earlier thaw in the bilateral 
relations.
The same year, Turkey announced plans to purchase Chinese-made 
air-defense systems, which mounted the tension between Ankara and 
Washington. USA and other NATO allies voiced concerns over a mem-
ber state’s integration of Chinese-made hardware into NATO’s defence 
architecture. This controversial issue stemmed from Turkey’s concerns 
for being left alone in the face of regional threats and the search of 
diversifying the arms technology. However, apart from the tension it 
created, the issue brought together other political interactions with West 
states and notably USA.  (Kurtbag, 2015, 199-200)
A set of domestic political developments inside Turkey escalated 
the state of crisis in relations with USA. Turkish Government’s tough 
stance against Gezi Protests and so-called use of violence reawakened 
civil rights concerns of the West, notably the American Community. US 
top brass officially condemned the use of violence and criticized the 
statements of Turkish political leaders, notably PM Tayyip Erdogan, in 
which some Jews-led shadowy interest groups were blamed for the un-
rest (Zanotti, 2015, 29). Subsequent to December 17th incident of cor-
ruption-related arrests of Turkish businessmen having close ties with 
the government, Turkish government officials blamed Gulen Movement 
for bringing the corruption charges due to political motivations (Onar, 
2016, 7). At presidential level, Turkey demanded extradition of Fethul-
lah Gulen, the leader of the movement residing in USA; however the 
US officials did not comply with the request on the grounds of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence of Gulen movement’s wrongdoings, which cre-
ated another atmosphere of mistrust in Turkey-US relations (Zanotti, 
2015, 5). In addition, USA became much attuned to the later domestic 
political developments in Turkey. US officials expressed at every op-
portunity concerns regarding civil liberties and political instabilities. In 
the first half of 2015, US Senate sent letters to Turkey condemning the 
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so-called media repression and censorship (Zanotti, 2015, 8) and such 
statements and interventions by US officials only fueled the tension in 
the relations. 
As for the foreign agenda, in the second phase of the Arab spring, 
Turkey’s split with Assad regime in the wake of the uprisings that occured 
in Syria was welcomed by Washington on the grounds that Turkey was 
willing to stand with the West on the issue. However, US top brass mis-
trusted Ankara suspecting the Anti-Assad stance to be an instrument of 
bringing Sunni factions into a position of control in Syria (Falk, 2014, 15). 
 
BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY’S VICINITY 
During the course of the Syrian conflict, Obama administration 
primarily chose to abstain from undergoing a costly military operation 
and proposed the settlement of the conflict through peace talks. (Kur-
tbag, 2015, 196) American “wait-and-see” policy was undermined by 
later developments and the upsurge of the threat by the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). From 2013 to late 2014, the Islamic State 
established a power base in Syria and achieved total control of the ad-
jacent regions to its stonghold of Raqqa. Gaining the upperhand in the 
confrontations with other rebel groups of different causes, the group 
consolidated its military power by use of policies of divide and rule in 
tribal communities of the region. Concurrent with the advancement of 
leverage in Syria, the organization managed to take control of the parts 
of important Iraqi cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi. In June, Iraq’s 
second biggest city Mosul was captured by the Islamic State much 
to the consternation of the world political communities. On June 29, 
2014, the Islamic State proclaimed the caliphate and demanded staunch 
support from all Muslims throughout the world. (Blanchard&Humud, 
2016, 6-7) US “wait-and-see” policy was abrogated in the face of the 
ISIL threat. US-led coalition powers conducted air strikes against ISIL 
while still abstaining from direct ground military operation to Syria.
In efforts of keeping ISIL’s territorial expansion in check and under-
mining its regional leverage, USA sought to consolidate the positions of 
other militia groups, notably Kurdish Militia in Syrian territories. PYD 
(the Democratic Union Party) was singled out as a local ally in the fight 
against the ISIL, which contradicted with the Turkish regional interests 
and mounted the state of alarm in Turkish threat perception against Kur-
dish movement in Syria. (Zanotti, 2016, 7-8)
Earlier, PYD had emerged as one of the strongest warring parties 
in the Syrian turmoil and ultimately proclaimed the so-called political 
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autonomy in the Rojava region (Syrian Kurdistan) of three cantons: 
Efrin, Kobanê and Cêzîre. This de facto Kurdish Authority adjacent 
to its territories was not welcome by Turkey on the grounds of PYD’s 
close association and affiliation with PKK. (Ozturk, 2014, 77-79)
USA has recognized PKK as a terrorist organization since 1997 
but PYD has not yet been regarded a terrorist organization. Latest US 
political and military support for PYD has irritated Turkey.   American 
envoy Brett McGurk’s visit to Kobani in January 2016 became the last 
straw for Turkey. (Arslan, 2016) President Erdogan, in retaliation, said: 
“How can we trust you? Is it us that is your partner or is it the terrorists 
in Kobani?” (Ochoa, 2016) The feud deepened when US officials rejec-
ted Turkish claims of US weapons procurement to PYD and arms smug-
gling transpiring from PYD to PKK. Later Russion support for PYD as 
well coupled Turkey’s solitude in the stance against Syrian Kurds,  and 
later developments occured parallel to this status quo.
CONCLUSION AND THE WAY AHEAD
Historically, US policy toward Turkey had only been a by-product 
of policies toward the entire region, a tradition which was later amended 
by the rule of AK Party. No other government in Turkish political his-
tory has pursued more independent foreign policy than AK Party gov-
ernments. Under AK Party rule, Turkey has earned more potency and 
become more influential on the regional and global scale with the un-
precedented foreign policy understandings introduced by the party. Dis-
avowing the inferior role assigned by Western powers, Turkey has man-
aged to ascend to the position of USA’s equal partner and ally in joint 
foreign policy moves. However, it is still an ongoing routine that USA 
leaves Turkey in the lurch on the regional issues every so often while 
prudently abstaining from undergoing acts which may alienate Turkey 
in earnest. Turkey’s relations with USA through recent developments 
should be assessed in this regard.
At the current juncture, the atmosphere of the bilateral relations 
is contingent upon the prospective regional developments. The mutual 
stance adopted in the Syrian conflicts as well as the Kurdish issue and 
conformity of Turkey’s domestic political developments to US expect-
ations will be the determinants of the new atmosphere. 
It remains to be seen how the new developments in Iraq and Syria 
will affect bilateral relations and what will president-elect Trump’s 
policies be like towards Turkey. 
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